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Abstract: 1966, the tenth anniversary of the 1956 Revolution, was a key year in US–
Hungarian relations. Diplomatic relations were raised from the lowest to the highest level, 
but suspicion and tension remained. Neither side knew what to expect from the other on 
account of the anniversary, the Vietnam War, economic and cultural negotiations, and the 
fate of Cardinal Mindszenty. A traditional diplomatic historical approach is supplemented 
here with cultural materials to present the full scale of contacts ranging from high political 
issues to the visit of Hollywood movie star Kirk Douglas in Budapest. First Secretary of 
the Legation for Press and Cultural Affairs Edward Alexander receives special attention, 
because he played a crucial role in the events of 1966. As press secretary, he helped calm 
Hungarian fears over what American journalists might report about the anniversary, while 
as cultural affairs officer he worked on documenting and expanding American cultural 
presence in Hungary. In the latter capacity, he opened the USIA Library at the Legation, 
fraternized with blacklisted painters of the Zuglói Kör [‘Zugló Circle’], monitored the 
Hungarian stage production of My Fair Lady, and reported on the publication of American 
literature in Hungarian. 
Keywords: United States-Hungarian relations, Cold War, 1956 Revolution and War of 
Independence, Vietnam War, My Fair Lady, Kirk Douglas, Edward Alexander, János Kádár, 
Hungarian art, USIA, cultural diplomacy 
 
Biography: Tibor Glant majored in History and English at the University of Debrecen (1986–91) and earned an MA 
(1992) and a PhD (1996) in History from the University of Warwick, UK. He has taught various courses on 
American history and culture (including US–Hungarian relations) since 1991 at various universities in the UK, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Rumania, the United States, and Hungary. He has served as chair of the North American 
Department in Debrecen since 2002 and as director of the American Studies doctoral program since 2011. He is the 
current president of the Hungarian Association of American Studies and director of the Center for International 
Migration Studies at Debrecen. He published six scholarly books (two in English) and numerous articles on various 
aspects of twentieth–century US–Hungarian relations. This article is a byproduct of his recently completed second 
Fulbright (with Texas Christian University, Fort Worth, TX). Website: http://ieas.unideb.hu/glant 
 
1966 marked the tenth anniversary of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and War of 
Independence as well as the end of arguably the most hostile decade in American–Hungarian 
relations and the first steps towards “normalization.” In this paper first we will review the major 
events of the year in bilateral relations and then introduce a hitherto neglected dimension: the 
role of American cultural diplomacy through the reports of First Secretary of the Legation for 
Press and Cultural Affairs Edward Alexander. In the ten years between 1956 and 1966, the 
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United States reduced diplomatic presence to the lowest possible level and was represented by 
temporary Charges d’Affaires in communist Hungary. Then, in November 1966 the two 
countries agreed to raise permanent diplomatic representation to the highest level and struck an 
agreement about exchanging ambassadors for the first time ever (Kovrig 1991: 103–9). To 
understand this dramatic shift in relations we must take a cursory look at the history of those ten 
troubled years.  
 After the suppression of the 1956 Revolution communist dictator János Kádár was more 
interested in stabilizing his domestic control and political standing within the Soviet Bloc than in 
getting his country out of the ensuing diplomatic isolation from the West. A brutal campaign of 
retaliation was combined with a typical totalitarian war on memory: “the unfortunate events of 
October” were dubbed as a “counter–revolution” sponsored by “Western imperialists” 
(especially the CIA), “Horthy–fascists” (residing in West Germany), and “criminal elements” 
inside the country. By the mid–1960s a new, supplementary narrative emerged: there were 
“mistakes of the past” but the new regime had “realized many of the goals of 1956” in a peaceful 
manner. By 1960, however, it became obvious to the Party leadership in Budapest that Hungary 
needed to improve its relations with the West to boost the economic performance of the country 
and get loans in hard currency. This was a key element of the so–called “Kádár compromise” 
forced upon a Hungarian society not allowed to digest the 1956 trauma: people would accept the 
official communist narrative of the events in return for a standard of living higher than in any of 
the neighboring communist regimes. The 1960 partial amnesty was the first symbolic, and 
impactful, step that signaled a new course in Budapest. It was followed by an economic opening 
towards West Germany and attempts to feel out Washington’s willingness to resume the 
discussion of outstanding bilateral issues. The Kennedy White House made it clear that any 
improvement in bilateral relations hinged on a general amnesty for revolutionaries still in jail 
(Borhi 2015: 173–217).  
 For the Eisenhower administration in the United States, October–November 1956 was an 
eventful period: the twin upheavals in Poland and Hungary coincided with the end of the 
presidential election campaign while the Middle East was rocked by the Suez crisis. The two 
superpowers carefully avoided direct interference in the other’s sphere of influence during the 
course of the events (the United States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in Egypt), but 
both pushed for United Nations action post facto (McCauley 1981). To avoid a Soviet veto, the 
US brought the “Hungarian problem” (or the “Hungarian question”) before the General 
Assembly and not the Security Council. The Soviet Union was condemned for violating 
Hungarian sovereignty and the Kádár regime for the political executions and other massive 
violations of human rights. A “Special Committee” (also known as the “Committee of Five”) 
was set up to investigate the events before, during, and after the Revolution. Its final report was 
submitted in the summer of 1958, just as Imre Nagy and other revolutionary leaders were being 
executed in Hungary. Also in 1958 Sir Leslie Munro of New Zealand was appointed UN Special 
Representative to monitor the situation in Hungary. His work was terminated in late 1962, as a 
result of a deal between Budapest and Washington (Luard 1989: 58–74). 
Washington agreed to remove the “Hungarian question” from the UN agenda in return for 
the “general amnesty” demanded by the Kennedy administration, which took place in 1963. The 
next year, Budapest negotiated a diplomatic accord with the Vatican without involving the 
United States, although Cardinal József Mindszenty was still enjoying the hospitality of the US 
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Legation in Budapest, where he had sought refuge on November 4, 1956. Additional unresolved 
problems between the US and Hungary further complicated bilateral relations, including 
financial claims on both sides, disagreements over the future course of cultural relations, the fate 
of the Hungarian Holy Crown and assorted coronation regalia, politically active Hungarian 
immigrants in the US opposing any attempt at rapprochement, and public Hungarian 
government–level hate speech targeting the United States on account of the Vietnam War. That 
notwithstanding, less than two years after the “hottest moment of the Cold War” (the Cuban 
Missile Crisis of October–November 1962), President Lyndon Johnson announced a new policy 
of “bridge building” towards the Soviet Bloc (Borhi 2015: 221–30). 
Still, what ensued was an ugly tug of war between Budapest and Washington, with fist 
shaking and finger pointing. Hungary negotiated not to settle outstanding bilateral issues but to 
publicly peg the United States as an imperialist power trying to interfere in the domestic affairs 
of other countries. In this new Hungarian strategy cultural diplomacy was linked to the Vietnam 
War in a unique way: alone in the Soviet Bloc, Budapest refused to sign a bilateral cultural 
exchange agreement before American withdrawal from Vietnam. The reason for this was that 
while anything American was welcomed by the general Hungarian public, a paranoid Party 
leadership viewed all American attempts at cultural diplomacy, including art, academic 
exchanges, and the Peace Corps, as subversive action (Borhi 2015: 231–42). And these 
communist fears were not unfounded: between the 1880s and 1945, Hungarians systematically 
studied the culture, political system, and economy of the United States and developed an overtly 
positive image of the transatlantic “Promised Land.” American popular culture (especially film 
and pulp fiction) had played a crucial role in shaping Hungarian culture between the world wars, 
and postwar communist hate speech about the “exploitation of the working class” and “fascist 
American geopolitics” carried little credibility with the general public (Szemjonov 1953, Glant 
2008, 2010, 2013). At the same time, the State Department successfully wielded the appeal of 
American culture as a “weapon” in the Cold War through the United States Information Agency 
(USIA) and private partners like the Ford Foundation as well as universities, such as Columbia, 
Harvard, and the University of California. In this world of politically driven cultural diplomacy 
Americans preferred exchanges in the fields of performing and fine arts, as well as history, 
political science, and sociology, while Hungary wanted to send natural scientists and agricultural 
experts to circumvent trade and technology transfer restrictions. In other words, the communist 
government of Hungary hoped to access American agricultural technology, farm products, and 
items on the COCOM list (Medails 2009: 134–59). 
The first post–1956 round of bilateral negotiations began in 1964. Hungary made 
multiple concessions, including signing an agreement with the Ford Foundation for international 
exchanges, agreeing to stop jamming Radio Free Europe and Voice of America broadcasts, and 
inviting American businesses to participate at the annual Budapest International Fair in 1965. At 
the same time, orthodox communists (mostly in the Ministry of the Interior) felt that American 
cultural penetration had gone too far, and took action. On February 13, 1965 a regular, 
“spontaneous” demonstration against the Vietnam War was held outside the US Legation in 
Szabadság tér [‘Freedom Square’], in the heart of Budapest. This time, however, demonstrators 
broke into the American mission and ravaged the building. The US suspended bilateral talks, and 
Budapest decided to go along, citing American human rights violations in Vietnam as the main 
reason (Borhi 2015: 231–9). October 1966, the tenth anniversary of the Revolution, rolled 
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around in an atmosphere of thinly veiled hostility and suspicion. Meanwhile, in August 1965 
Edward Alexander arrived in Budapest. He was to play a key part in shaping and reporting on the 
events of 1966. 
Available diplomatic records indicate limited activity on both sides in 1966. A new round 
of negotiations was initiated by the Americans in April, which the Hungarians accepted. The 
Hungarian Foreign Ministry wanted to focus on the financial claims settlement and trade 
relations while cutting back on cultural advances. The State Department was interested in 
moving forward on the Mindszenty issue and wanted to expand cultural ties. Negotiations came 
to a halt again, until a tragic event in the fall set things in motion once more. On September 23 
Charge d’Affaires ad interim Elim O’Shaughnessy passed away unexpectedly. On October 8, 
Hungarian Foreign Minister János Péter and US Secretary of State Dean Rusk met in person. 
Péter again raised the issue of exchanging ministers, and Rusk agreed when he was told that 
Budapest did not consider Cardinal Mindszenty’s presence at the Legation an obstacle. On 
November 11, Hungarian Charge d’Affaires János Radványi was officially informed by the State 
Department that the United States was ready to elevate bilateral relations and exchange 
ambassadors (Borhi 2015: 241–2).  
The fact that a decade–long standoff was cleared up within three weeks of the tenth 
anniversary of the outbreak of the revolution suggests that what did not happen mattered just as 
much as what did happen. Demonstrations against the Vietnam War continued outside the US 
Legation in Budapest, but the building itself was not attacked in 1966. At the same time, US 
media coverage of the anniversary tended to focus as much on the present as on the past. A case 
in point is Ken Foote’s seven–page special article for the Sunday magazine section of the New 
York Times on November 20 (Glant 2007: 8–9). In April, an NBC crew came to Budapest to 
shoot material for a documentary that would be shown on American television on November 13, 
under the title “Hungary—Ten Years After.” The Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs granted 
unprecedented access to people and locations to the six Americans, who, according to a report by 
Alexander, “never went beyond the limits defined by the MFA or the Legation, and checked out 
all sensitive themes with the Legation before proceeding.”1 Traditional diplomatic historical 
records thus suggest that both parties wanted to err on the side of caution to avoid open 
confrontation over the events of ten years before. Still, if we dig deeper into cultural diplomatic 
records, i.e. Alexander’s reports to the State Department on the scope and details of his daily 
work, a somewhat different story unfolds. In the second half of this paper we take a closer look 
at the performance of this most interesting American diplomat in Budapest during the crucial 
year of 1966.  
Born in 1920 into an Armenian–American family, Alexander attended Columbia 
University and got a masters degree from its Graduate School of Journalism. During the Second 
World War he served in the Psychological Warfare Division of the US Army in Europe and in 
1950 joined the Voice of America. He set up and operated the Transcaucasian Branch of VOA 
                                                 
1 “NBC Team Completes Filming Documentary on Hungary,” Budapest Legation to State, May 5, 1966, 2 pages, 
National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, MD, RG 59 General Records of the Department of 
State, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964–66, Box 340, Folder: CUL 6 HUNG 1/1/64. 
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and launched its Armenian program. From 1959 to 1964 he worked for RIAS (Radio in the 
American Sector) in West Berlin. In 1964 he was assigned to the Budapest legation, learned 
Hungarian in one year, and held his post until 1969. He later served in Athens and East Berlin, 
and was harassed by a KGB agent who tried, unsuccessfully, to turn him using his Armenian 
background as leverage against him. Alexander gave an in–depth interview on his professional 
career in 1988 and also penned a political memoir (Alexander 1990) as well as a fictitious 
intelligence thriller, Opus (2000), which takes place in Cold War Hungary (Tuch 1988). He is 
still alive at 96 and lives in retirement in Bethesda, Maryland.  
As First secretary of the Legation for Press and Cultural Affairs, Alexander was tasked 
with both managing American press relations in Hungary and managing cultural diplomacy, two 
separate full–time jobs. In the first capacity, he had to mediate between American journalists and 
the communist government of Hungary. His four surviving reports on the press from 1966 
indicate a relationship more complex than the one suggested by traditional diplomatic and press 
histories, including the present author’s previous work (Glant 2007 and Borhi 2015). Alexander 
encountered a Hungarian government torn between the desire to move along the path of internal 
liberalization and insecurity over what American journalists might report about the tenth 
anniversary of the revolution. As press officer he ran into considerable red tape and had to work 
hard to ease such Hungarian fears and insecurities. As cultural affairs officer, however, he had to 
extend American cultural presence in Hungary even at the expense of feeding the same fears and 
insecurities. This duality makes his tour of duty in Hungary uniquely interesting. 
Western journalists submitted the first requests to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry for 
anniversary coverage access as early as February 1966. Not only were these turned down, but an 
unnamed ministry official straightforwardly told a West German TV reporter, “This is not 
something we are going to celebrate.” To prevent Hungarian students from being exposed to 
unwanted ideas, the Ministry of the Interior instructed all universities to restrict travel abroad 
programs for the fall.2 Thus, the visit of the NBC crew was more the exception than the rule, and 
its April visit emerged as the feel–good story of the year in press relations. Led by producer 
Gerald Green and journalist Frank Bourgholtzer, the American team interviewed high–ranking 
communist officials, prominent intellectuals, and people in the street. Only three of their requests 
were turned down: they were not granted a one–on–one with either Kádár or Mindszenty, and 
were denied access to the building of the Communist Party headquarters. In turn, as has been 
noted, they fully cooperated with the Hungarian Foreign Ministry and the US Legation. 
Hungarian insecurity was on full display when, during the shooting, Kitty Havas of the Foreign 
Ministry repeatedly asked Alexander to convince American journalists to not “dramatize” the 
anniversary “anymore than necessary.” The American diplomat responded, “[E]very medium 
kept a morgue of background material for just such occasions, but… for the tenth anniversary of 
the Revolt, some would obtain new material which should allay the MFA’s fears because if 
                                                 
2 “Hungarian Government Seeks to Minimize Anniversary of 1956 Revolt,” Budapest Legation to State, February 
23, 1966, 1 page, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964–
66, Box 340, Folder: CUL 6 HUNG 1/1/64.  
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Hungary had really achieved the aims of 1956, as is often heard in Budapest, all stories would 
reflect such progress.”3 
The fall of 1966 brought both tension and relief for the Hungarian government. Tension 
grew with the coming of the anniversary (which, in turn, meant an increase in the number of 
press accreditation requests from the West) and insecurity over what might happen peaked when 
the head of the American diplomatic mission passed away in late September. The Péter–Rusk 
meeting in early October, however, yielded much needed relief: the American Secretary of State 
was not only willing to meet his Hungarian counterpart in person but also made a gesture by 
suggesting that instead of temporary representatives or ministers, ambassadors should be 
exchanged after O’Shaughnessy’s death (Magyarics 1994: 140–4). Budapest interpreted this as a 
signal that Washington was not going to seek confrontation on October 23, so the Foreign 
Ministry felt less compelled to grant additional favors to the foreign press. The red tape went up 
again. 
On November 3, Alexander reported five incidents involving American journalists, in 
which, however hard he tried, he could not help. Hughes Rudd of CBS Bonn, Stephen 
Nordlinger of the Baltimore Sun, Reuters correspondent William Kessler, and Washington Post 
journalist Anatloe Shub were all denied visas to enter Hungary for the weekend of October 23. 
The feel–good story of the spring also turned sour: NBC decided to delay the screening of the 
documentary shot in April in the hope that additional footage might be acquired from the actual 
anniversary in October. However, a request to be allowed to return was rejected on the excuse 
that he Foreign Ministry could accommodate only the six Western camera crews already in 
Budapest. Alexander pushed again, this time only for crew chief Bourgholtzer to come with but a 
hand–held camera; still, he was rebuffed: “NBC had already had its chance in April and had full 
cooperation from the MFA.” On the other hand, the Shub story indicated that the Foreign 
Ministry was willing to take some risks even at such a potentially explosive moment. Instead of 
Shub, who was considered a friendly journalist by Budapest, Seymour Freidin of the World–
Journal–Tribune syndicate was admitted. His post–anniversary articles in the Paris Herald 
Tribune were described as downright “dirty” by a Hungarian official, who also noted the 
“Freidin did not have to come to Hungary to write them.” Shub later told Alexander that since 
the Post owned half of the Herald Tribune, his articles would have enjoyed preference in the 
French edition of the paper over those of Freidin in terms of publication. The American diplomat 
gloatingly told the journalist that he should “make this point clear to the MFA.”4 
Edward Alexander the cultural diplomat arrived in Hungary with a clear purpose: he 
wanted to open the first USIA library in Budapest. As cultural affairs officer of the legation and 
                                                 
3 “GOH Concern over US Observance of 1956 Revolt,” Budapest Legation to State, March 31, 1966, 2 pages and 
“NBC Team Completes Filming Documentary on Hungary,” Budapest Legation to State, May 5, 1966, 2 pages, 
NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964–66, Box 340, 
Folder: CUL 6 HUNG 1/1/64. The quotes are from the second document. 
 
4 “GOH Bars Journalists Covering Revolt Anniversary,” Budapest Legation to State, November 3, 1966, 3 pages, 
NARA, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964–66, Box 340, 
Folder: CUL 6 HUNG 1/1/64. 
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given that British and French libraries were already operating in the Hungarian capital, he 
approached the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with his plan. He was flatly turned down, 
but decided to go ahead nonetheless, although he was keenly aware that by opening the library in 
the building of the Legation (the only option left open by Hungarian authorities) he was risking 
still another “spontaneous” demonstration turning into a physical attack on the American 
mission. To take away the edge of this unilateral move, Alexander decided not to advertise the 
opening of the library and relied on word of mouth instead. On March 21, 1966 the opening 
ceremony took place with only seven Hungarians attending, and in the first three days altogether 
twelve reading visitors showed up.5 This was because the Ministry of the Interior monitored and 
intimidated people in touch with the American Legation and its diplomats (Borhi 2015: 235). 
Alexander upped the ante by starting to show films preapproved by the Foreign Ministry. By 
1968, screenings at the (by then) Embassy had become the go to event in Budapest: in that year 
alone, more than a thousand people watched arguably the most highly–rated USIS documentary, 
John F. Kennedy: Years of Lightning, Day of Drums (1964). The American diplomat’s “lasting 
achievement” left a mark on the intelligence services of the entire Soviet Bloc. Ten years later he 
was serving as the Public Affairs Officer of the US Embassy in East Berlin and proposed a 
similar library project. His communist counterpart rebuffed him: “We know you and we know 
what you did in Hungary. And I just want to tell you one thing. The German Democratic 
Republic is not Hungary” (Tuch 1988: 23–7). 
The opening of the USIA library was an integral part of a broader project to extend and 
document American cultural influence in communist Hungary in the mid–1960s. Between 
October 1965 and December 1966, Alexander prepared detailed “Monthly Cultural Reports” for 
the State Department. At the end of 1966 he decided to terminate the project since the 
“preparation of the report was extremely time–consuming, demanding careful perusal of 
countless newspapers, magazines, books, film and theater schedules, radio listening, television 
watching and every kind of activity which contributed to the sum total of its monthly content.”6 
His main interest was literature. In December 1965, Alexander wrote a summary report on the 
publication of American literary texts since the 1956 revolution and continued to list such pieces 
item by item in his monthly reports. He quickly grasped the significance of Nagyvilág [‘Big 
World’ in his translation], the leading literary monthly throughout the Kádár era, and cultivated 
its editors in person by providing them with both academic and literary materials.7 He also 
                                                 
5 “Opening of Legation Library,” Budapest legation to State, March 25, 1966, 2 pages, NARA, RG 59 General 
Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964–66, Box 340, Folder: CUL 10–5 Hung 
1/1/64. 
 
6 “Cessation of Monthly Cultural Report,” Budapest Embassy to State, December 22, 1966, 1 page, NARA, RG 59 
General Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964–66, Box 340, Folder: CUL – 
CULTURE HUNG 1/1/64. This folder has all the reports. 
 
7 “American Fiction in Hungary Since 1945,” Budapest Legation to State (Info: Moscow, Warsaw, Bucharest, 
Prague, Sofia, Berlin, and Vienna), December 31, 1965, 5 pages and “Literary Monthly Publishes American 
Authors,” Budapest Legation to State, February 9, 1966, 4 pages, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the 
Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964–66, Box 340, Folder: CUL 10–5 Hung 1/1/64. 
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supervised the agreement between CBS and ARTISJUS (the Hungarian copyright agency) about 
the translation and stage production of My Fair Lady.8 The musical opened in February 1966, 
and Alexander was invited to a post–performance party in Fészek [‘Nest,’ the Hungarian Artists’ 
Club] by translator Tamás Ungvári. The American diplomat reported that he had “the most 
substantive conversations” with his host on the difficulties of translation and the status of 
American culture in Hungary.9  
Alexander’s involvement with a group of blacklisted painters points to the subversive 
nature of his job as cultural diplomat. Communists tended to view art as a tool of achieving 
political goals. Therefore, abstract, nonfigurative painting was irreconcilable with the socialist 
concept of art and was promptly persecuted behind the Iron Curtain. When the American Library 
was opened, graphic artist Imre Bak came by and inquired about contemporary American 
abstract art. He informed the American diplomat that a group of painters was planning an 
exhibit, Új Törekvések [‘New Strivings’ in Alexander’s translation], at the Ferihegy airport. But 
when they took a sample of their paintings to the Ministry of the Interior for approval, an official 
“took one look at the prospectus and was appalled. He was invited to see the paintings 
themselves, and when he did, he reportedly staggered out of the studio muttering about the 
insanity of modern art.” The group in question was the Zuglói Kör [‘Zugló Circle,’ named after a 
suburb of Budapest where they regularly met], and the exhibit, of course, was banned (Andrási 
1991). However, the Guggenheim Museum in New York City got word of the artists and asked 
for photographic images of their work. When Alexander saw the low quality of the prints in their 
homemade prospectus, he offered to take Kodachrome pictures and deliver them. He invited Bak 
and his fellow artists to his home to watch the USIA slide collection on contemporary American 
painting and requested additional materials through diplomatic channels.10 However, he was less 
impressed by the work of officially supported artists. In that hectic month of the anniversary of 
1956, October 1966, Műcsarnok (one of the Budapest art galleries) hosted an exhibition of more 
than two hundred paintings by nine of the most recognized contemporary Hungarian artists 
working at home. Alexander visited the exhibit on the very last day to see both the paintings and 
the written feedback in the guest book. He reported a feeling of déjà vu: most of the paintings on 
display reminded him of “some painter of the French school from the early part of our century.” 
Communist propaganda was all over the place, but “nowhere was there evidence of the many 
western schools of painting that have arisen since before World War II.” He described 
contemporary nonfigurative artists as “cultural freedom fighters [who] are compelled to defend a 
position today which was not only defended but won by [their] western counterparts almost four 
                                                 
8 “My Fair Lady,” Budapest Legation to State, November 2, 1965, 2 pages, NARA, RG 59 General Records of the 
Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964–66, Box 340, Folder: CUL 10–5 Hung 1/1/64. 
 
9 “Premier of ‘My Fair Lady’,” Budapest Legation to State, February 16, 1966, 3 pages, NARA, RG 59 General 
Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964–66, Box 340, Folder: CUL 10–5 Hung 
1/1/64. 
 
10 “Information Material for Young Artists’ Group,” Budapest Legation to State, August 1, 1966, 2 pages, NARA, 
RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964–66, Box 340, Folder: CUL 
10–5 Hung 1/1/64. 
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decades ago.”11 Alexander failed to realize that abstract art not conveying simplified, pre–
approved political messages was at best grudgingly tolerated in communist countries.  
In April 1966 Hollywood film star Kirk Douglas visited Hungary and his stay produced 
one of the highlights of the year. He was a household name in Hungary, too, on account of 
Spartacus (1960), which he himself had produced and starred in. The Spartacus story was a 
classic class struggle epic that communists championed, but there was a lot more to this Kubrick 
classic. As producer, Douglas insisted that screenwriter Dalton Trumbo (one of the famous 
Hollywood Ten) be fully credited in the movie, thus breaking down the blacklist that had been in 
effect for much of the 1950s. Therefore, he was twice the hero when he came to Budapest during 
a tour of the Soviet Bloc (Ceplair and Trumbo 2015: chapters 18 and 19). His three demands in 
each country were to learn a local folk song, lecture a large student body, and meet the local 
Communist Party boss. Alexander described him as “a real difficult person. Edgy, prickly. But 
cooperative, too.” Douglas’ first request was easy to meet, the second one unlikely, the third one 
well–nigh impossible. And yet, in the end it was only Douglas’ third request that ended up being 
met in Budapest. There was no official protocol for presenting an American movie star to a 
communist dictator, so this time Alexander had to improvise. He took Douglas to Mátyás Pince, 
since he knew that Kádár would have dinner there on occasion. He struck gold as the Hungarian 
communist dictator was indeed there that night with his wife. The American diplomat walked up 
to him, introduced himself in Hungarian, and asked the party boss if he wanted to meet Douglas. 
When they clarified that it was indeed the Kirk Douglas of Spartacus fame, Kádár agreed. The 
three–day visit also featured a lecture to some sixty guests from the world of Hungarian film and 
television, instead of a presentation in front of a large student body. Douglas was so happy with 
the meeting with Kádár that he chose not to learn a folk song. Alexander’s ingenuity became a 
legend in American diplomatic circles since none of his fellow diplomats could arrange for a 
meeting between their local party bosses and the American actor (Tuch 1988: 20–3).  
Hostility and suspicion provided the context for US–Hungarian relations throughout 
1966. Diplomats of both countries needed special permits even to leave the capital city they were 
serving in, and both Legations were severely undermanned. After the February 1965 attack, the 
American mission lived under the gun as “spontaneous” demonstrations against the Vietnam 
War were a common sight on Szabadság tér. Official cultural relations also hit rock bottom when 
the United States banned Hungarian government officials from entering the country. This meant 
that even Alexander’s most important contact, Gábor Vígh (the American Desk Officer in the 
Institute for Cultural Relations), could not go on a Ford Foundation scholarship “all because of 
Vietnam.” Vígh confided to the American, “I might as well tell you, things are very bad, even for 
us. Please don’t ask me to have lunch with you, either. Relations are worsening even to the 
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degree that I must not be seen with you longer than is necessary.”12 Always more willing to talk, 
Americans could not understand why Hungary was so uncompromising about Vietnam, while 
other Iron Curtain countries (with the exception of the Soviet Union and the GDR) were not. The 
key to this puzzle may be found not in Vietnam but in the Kádár regime’s own insecurity about 
its contact with the United States. Even ten years after, the root of the problem was, of course, 
1956. 
The genesis myth of the Kádár regime hinged on both suppressing the actual memory and 
claiming the legacy of “the unfortunate events of October.” In various white papers and fake 
“histories” (see for example Hollós 1967), Kádár and his team blamed the United States for the 
violence in late 1956. In this parallel reality, “mistakes of the past” separated the Rákosi era from 
the “new start” and “peaceful progress” of the post–1956 world. In May, Alexander cleverly 
lectured Kitty Havas on this contradiction (see footnote 3). Ten years after the Revolution, the 
newly–forged “Kádár compromise” depended on the (economic) goodwill of Washington, but 
the Hungarian party boss could neither make concessions to nor ask favors from the United 
States he himself blamed for the unnecessary bloodshed in 1956. The presence of Cardinal 
Mindszenty at the Legation added insult to injury and made life more difficult for both sides. 
Communist insecurity was further fuelled by the glaring gap between official hate speech 
targeting the United States and the immense popularity of American culture in Hungary, dating 
back to the interwar years. A divided Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party leadership could not 
decide which path to follow. Economists pushed for sacrificing prestige for loans, while the 
security establishment pursued a hard line even at the expense of occasionally sabotaging 
ongoing diplomatic talks. Cases in point include, on one side, the IMF talks between 1966 and 
1968 and economic reforms in 1968 (Mong 2012), and, on the other side, the resumption of 
physical attacks on the US Embassy in 1967 and the expulsion of Columbia historian István 
Deák in 1973 on undisclosed charges (Borhi 2015: 223, 322–4). For the first five years of actual 
post–1956 diplomatic talks between the two countries (1964–69), Hungary negotiated not to 
achieve progress through compromise but to present the United States in a negative light. 
Magyarics concludes that the new “Hungarian party elite was held hostage by its own 
legitimizing myth of 1956 and felt that breaking out of it would mean the end of their political 
careers” (Magyarics 1994: 143, translation mine). 
Throughout the Cold War, the United States handled Hungary from a position of power: 
the New World giant had nothing to gain from improving relations while the very survival of 
Kádár’s regime depended on Western loans. The Kennedy administration helped stabilize the 
situation inside Hungary by extorting a series of amnesties from Kádár by 1963 but was not 
motivated to move forward or grant concessions to a totalitarian regime under foreign 
occupation. However, the policy of exporting American culture coincided with Washington’s 
desire to promote diversity beyond the Iron Curtain, and preferences were adjusted accordingly. 
The February 1965 siege of the Budapest Legation was a grim reminder that the Hungarian 
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concessions made in 1964 were not meant to last. Sending Edward Alexander, a professional 
Cold Warrior of VOA background, to Budapest was a risky move that paid off. He successfully 
eased official Hungarian fears of the United States taking advantage of the tenth anniversary of 
the Revolution. But, in his other capacity, Alexander also sabotaged Hungarian cultural policy by 
fraternizing with blacklisted painters and openly promoting American culture through the 
unauthorized American Library and in Nagyvilág.  American diplomats had been expelled from 
communist countries for much less than what he did in 1966 alone. The fact that this did not 
happen indicates a shift in Hungarian domestic politics that American diplomats clearly missed. 
György Aczél assumed control of Hungarian cultural policies in early 1967 and ushered in a 
compromise between leading intellectuals and the Kádár regime, which, in turn, strengthened the 
narrative of an “internally liberal” Hungary gradually becoming the “happiest barrack” behind 
the Iron Curtain.  
The key message of the cultural diplomatic survey of bilateral relations in 1966 presented 
above is that the tenth anniversary was a turning point in public diplomacy and in domestic 
Hungarian cultural politics, but not in US foreign policy towards the region. As has been pointed 
out twice before, what did not happen mattered as much as what did. Washington chose not to 
push Budapest on 1956, and the physical attacks on the US Legation were suspended. Hungary 
turned a blind eye to Alexander’s unusual actions in Budapest (perhaps because of his mediation 
as press secretary), and the United States used the unfortunate passing of her chief diplomat there 
to make a unilateral gesture by offering to raise diplomatic relations to the ambassadorial level. 
The uneventful tenth anniversary of the “counter–revolution” gave the necessary confidence to 
Kádár to go ahead with domestic liberalization, while the State Department missed these signals 
and decided not to adjust its course. Genuine normalization of bilateral relations began only with 
the incoming Nixon administration in the summer of 1969, but only after the two foreign 
services had weathered the storms of 1967 (renewed attacks on the Embassy and ambassador–
designate János Radványi’s desertion) and 1968 (the resumption of the jamming of American 
radios and Hungarian participation in the joint Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia). 
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